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
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Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West

Remarks by

Henry A. Kissinger



HOOVER INSTITUTION • STANFORD UNIVERSITY
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1977

Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, has successfully combined distinguished careers in academia and public service. The attached statement is Dr. Kissinger's first extensive foreign policy commentary since leaving the Department of State.

The remarks were made June 9, 1977, in Washington, D.C. at the Conference on Italy and Eurocommunism sponsored by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Dr. Kissinger was the featured speaker at the closing banquet held in The Commons at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution.

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speaks on

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June 9, 1977

Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West

The cohesion of the industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan has been for thirty years the bulwark of peace and the engine of global prosperity.

This unity has been the keystone of our foreign policy in every administration from President Truman to President Carter. The first permanent peacetime security alliance in American history was with the democratic nations of the Atlantic community; it was soon followed by our commitment to the security of Japan. Since then, the agenda of cooperation among the industrial democracies has spread from collective defense to common action on energy policy, economic recovery, the international economic system, relations with the Communist countries, and with the Third World. This cohesion rests not simply on material considerations of wealth and power but on a common moral foundation as well—on the shared conviction that the consent of the governed is the basis of government and that every individual enjoys inalienable rights and is entitled to constitutional liberties.

It is ironic that at the moment when the industrial democracies are most cohesive in their opposition to external threats, at a time when our cooperative efforts cover a broader range than ever, the unity developed with so much effort and imagination over a generation should be jeopardized by an internal danger—the growth of Communist parties and the danger of their accession to power in some of the countries of Western Europe.

In *Italy*, in the parliamentary elections of June 1976, the Communist party obtained 34 percent of the vote, strengthening its position as the second largest party and as a powerful rival of the Christian Democratic party which has governed Italy throughout the post-war period. The Communists' growth since the 1972 election has been primarily at the expense of the democratic socialist groups, and is part and parcel of an increasing and dangerous polarization of

Italian politics. The Communists have already achieved a virtual veto over government programs in the Italian Parliament.

In *France*, in the presidential election of April 1974, a coalition of the Communist and Socialist parties came within one percentage point of victory on the final ballot. A majority for this coalition in the parliamentary elections which must take place by March 1978 would bring Communist leaders into key ministerial positions. It would do so, moreover, in conditions of constitutional crisis, for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has not yet faced the test of a president and a prime minister from different parties.

In *the Iberian peninsula*, where hopeful steps are being taken towards democracy, Communist parties have fought with ruthlessness and disciplined organization to increase their already considerable influence. Portugal is a member of NATO; Spain is strategically crucial and tied by special agreements to the United States. Communist participation in the government of either country would have serious consequences for Western security.

And these Communist challenges do not exist in isolation from each other. There is no doubt that a Communist breakthrough to power or a share in power in one country will have a major psychological effect on the others, by making Communist parties seem respectable, or suggesting that the tide of history in Europe is moving in their direction.

Most of the causes of this phenomenon are indigenous to the individual countries. And by the same token, the response to this challenge must come in the first instance from European leaders and voters who are persuaded that democracy is worth the effort. America cannot make their choices for them or decide the outcome of free elections.

But America *must* recognize the significance of what may lie ahead. We must not delude ourselves about what the accession of Communist leaders to executive power will mean to the most basic premises of American foreign policy. We must not confuse either our own people or those in allied countries who take our judgments seriously about the gravity of the threat. We must not weaken their resolve either by treating a Communist victory as inevitable—which it is not—or by imagining that a Communist electoral victory would be an accidental, transitory or inconsequential phenomenon. The ultimate decisions are for the voters of Europe to make. But they—

and we—would be indulging in wishful thinking if we all did not acknowledge now:

- that the accession to power of Communists in an allied country would represent a massive change in European politics;
- that it would have fundamental consequences for the structure of the post-war world as we have known it and for America's relationship to its most important alliances;
- and that it would alter the prospects for security and progress for *all* free nations.

The Communist Parties and Western Democracies

Those who take a less grave view of these prospects often claim that the European Communist parties are independent of Moscow, that they have been effectively democratized and assimilated, and that they therefore pose no international issue in the broader East-West context.

It is true enough that the centrifugal and polycentric tendencies in the Communist world are one of the most striking developments of our age. These schisms, moreover, are made doubly intense by the passions of a quasi-religious battle over what is true dogma and what is heresy. Symptomatic is the fact that the Soviet Union has used military force in the postwar period only against other Communist countries—in East Berlin, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and on the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-Soviet conflict may indeed be the most profound and potentially explosive current international conflict. Nor is there a serious observer who disputes that the Communist parties in Western Europe have in fact occasionally demonstrated some degree of independence from the Soviet Union.

But this hardly exhausts the issue. For we must ask: In what sense and on what issues are they independent? And what are the objective consequences for the West of their policies and programs?

We are entitled to certain skepticism about the sincerity of declarations of independence which coincide so precisely with electoral self-interest. One need not be a cynic to wonder at the decision of the

French Communists, traditionally perhaps the most Stalinist party in Western Europe, to renounce the Soviet concept of dictatorship of the proletariat without a single dissenting vote among 1700 delegates, as they did at their party Congress in February 1976, when all previous party Congresses had endorsed the same dictatorship of the proletariat by a similar unanimous vote of 1700 to nothing. Why was there not at least one lonely soul willing to adhere to the previous view? Much was made of this change as a gesture of independence. Now it turns out that the new Soviet constitution, in preparation for years, drops the phrase as well.

Throughout their existence, the guiding principle of the Communist parties has been their insistence that a minority had to seize power as the vanguard of the working class and impose its views on the rest of the population. This disdain for democratic procedures—whether it is presented in the traditional form of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” or wrapped in Gramsci’s more elegant phrase, “the hegemony of the working class”—is precisely what has historically distinguished the Communist from the Socialist parties. I find it hard to believe that after decades of vilifying Social Democracy and treating it as their mortal enemy, especially in every Communist country, Communist parties have suddenly become Social Democrats. Whether or not they are independent of Moscow, Communists represent a philosophy which by its nature and their own testimony stands outside the “bourgeois” framework of Western constitutional history; they are a movement that appeals to a different tradition and uses a largely misleading vocabulary.

To be sure, the French, Spanish, and Italian Communist parties have all recently declared their resolve “to work within the pluralism of political and social forces and to respect guarantees and develop all individual and collective freedoms.” Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais pledged their devotion to national independence and political pluralism at a conference of Communist parties in East Berlin in June 1976.

But can we take these declarations at face value? After all, Marchais has listed Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany as countries having a “pluralistic” party system. As recently as 1972, French Communist doctrine was that “there can be no return from socialism to capitalism.” And a few weeks ago, to the great irritation of their socialist allies, the French Communists estimated the cost of the

economic program of the two parties at over 100 billion dollars. The Communist program—by definition—calls for the radical transformation of society; by the very nature of their beliefs Communists will be driven to bring about institutional changes that would make their ascendancy permanent.

Moreover, are these professions of the national road to Communism and of devotion to democratic principle really so new? Let me read some quotations from European Communist leaders:

First: “The crux of the matter, and we Marxists should know this well, is this: every nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union, but by its own road, dependent on its historical, national, social, and cultural circumstances.”

That was from a speech by Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in February 1946.

Second: “We take the view that the method of imposing the Soviet system on (our country) would be wrong, since this method does not correspond to present-day conditions of development. . . . We take the view rather that the overriding interests of the . . . people in their present-day situation prescribe a different method. . . , namely the method of establishing a democratic anti-Fascist régime, a parliamentary democratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties for the people.”

That is from a proclamation of the (East) German Communist Party in June 1945.

Third: “The great national task facing the country cannot be solved by either the Communist party or by any other party alone. The Communist party holds that it does not have a monopoly, and it does not need the monopoly, to work among the masses for the reconstruction of the new (nation). The Communist party does not approve of the idea of a one-party system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well.”

That is a statement by Erno Gero, Communist party leader of Hungary, in November 1944.

Fourth: "In (our country) there is a division of functions, and State power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. (Our country) can proceed and is proceeding along her own road."

That is from a speech by Władysław Gomułka, Communist party leader of Poland, in January 1946.

Fifth: "The Communist party seeks to attain socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to socialism. . . . The coalition of the Communists with other parties is not opportunistic, a temporary limited coalition, but the expression . . . of all strata of the working people. . . . We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods . . . be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictest guardians of the new Constitution."

That is a statement by Klement Gottwald, Communist party leader of Czechoslovakia, in January 1947.

Sixth: Marchais speaks of "Socialism in the colors of France." But in 1938, George Orwell described French Communist strategy as "marching behind the tricolour."

In short, what the leaders of the Western Communist parties are saying today about their affection for the processes of democracy is not significantly different from what East European Communist leaders declared with equal emphasis in the 1940s—before they seized the total power which they have never relinquished since.

Certainly Communist parties are willing to come to power by democratic means. But could they permit the democratic process to reverse what they see as the inevitable path of "historical progress?" Would they maintain the institutions—press, parties, unions, enterprises—that would represent the principal threat to their power?

Would they safeguard the freedoms that could turn into instruments of their future defeat? No Communist party that governed alone has ever done so, and the vast majority of those democratic parties which entered coalitions with European Communists are now in the indexes of history books rather than in ministries or parliaments.

The Italian Communist Party, to be sure, left the government following its disastrous defeat by the Christian Democrats in 1948. But the situation today is greatly changed. In 1948, the Communists were a far smaller party, with little regional or municipal power. They had to contend with a younger and more united Christian Democratic party, a strong Socialist party, and a determined Western Alliance alarmed by Stalin's adventures in Greece and Czechoslovakia. Today, Italian Communists participate in the governments of most major cities and regions, have enormous trade union strength, substantive support from intellectuals and the popular culture, and have reduced the strength of the Socialists to a fraction of what it was three decades ago.

The French Communists were similarly removed from the government in 1947, following the intensification of the Cold War. But, just as in the Italian case the following year, the popular revolt against the Communists took place within the framework of a united West with a clear perception of an external and internal threat to its survival. By contrast there are now many people on both sides of the Atlantic who have permitted themselves to be convinced that European communism is only Social democracy with a Leninist face.

We cannot know with certainty whether a fundamental change has occurred in these parties' traditional goals and tactics. But their internal organization and management speak against such a view. It is not democratic pluralism but the stern Leninist precept of "democratic centralism" which continues to guide the internal structure of all European Communist parties. This is a doctrine of iron discipline, not a principle of free and open dialogue. It is a system of dogma, of a "party line," of authority and obedience, of suppression of dissent and purge of dissenters. There are too many recent instances of resorts to violence, attempts to censor newspapers and broadcasting, and efforts to control the functioning of universities to be optimistic about their character.

Only in Western Europe and the United States are there still illusions about the nature of Communist parties. In Eastern Europe,

boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucratism have been obvious for decades. Countries which used to be leading industrial powers have been reduced to mediocrity and stagnation; nations with long democratic traditions have seen the destruction of civil liberties and democratic practices. The countries of the West would mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality. Societies that try to avoid difficult choices by making comforting assumptions about the future win no awards for restraint; they only speed their own demise.

Communist Parties and the Atlantic Alliance

It is sometimes asked: If the United States can deal with Communist governments in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and even Cuba or Vietnam, why can we not accept and learn to deal with Communist parties seeking power in Western Europe? Is not the Soviet Union uneasy about the prospect of new Communist régimes that they may not be able to control?

These questions miss the central point. There is a crucial difference between managing conflict with adversaries and maintaining an alliance among friends, particularly when the prospects for stable East-West relations depend vitally on the cohesion of the Western Alliance. And even if some West European Communist parties should prove more difficult than the better disciplined satellites of East Europe, and thus pose new problems for Moscow, they would pose far more serious problems for the West.

For the key issue is not how "independent" the European Communists would be, but how Communist. The dynamics of the Communist parties and the program on which they would be elected suggest that their foreign and domestic policies are not likely to be consistent with the common purposes of the Atlantic Alliance.

The solidarity of the great industrial democracies has maintained global security for thirty years. Western collective defense provided the shield behind which the United States, Western Europe and Japan developed the institutions of European unity and the progressive world economic system. All these relationships would be severely jeopardized if Communists came to power in allied governments.

Specifically:

The character of the Alliance would become confused to the American people. The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged in 1949 that "they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." If Communists entered governments in allied countries, the engagement to help maintain the military balance in Europe would lack the moral base on which it has stood for a generation. The American people would be asked to maintain their alliance commitment on the basis of two highly uncertain, untested assumptions: that there is a new trend of Communism which will in time split from Moscow, and that the West will be able to manipulate the new divisions to its advantage.

Both of these propositions are open to the most serious doubt. No major Communist split has ever been generated or maintained by deliberate Western policy—in fact the Soviet Union's disputes with Yugoslavia and with China had been festering for months and even years before the West became aware of them.

But even such a split—which would surely take years to develop—would hardly diminish the danger to current Allied relationships. By the time it occurred, the damage to the NATO structure would probably have become irreparable. And the character of the Atlantic relationship would be totally transformed, even should the United States, for its own reasons, eventually decide to support a revisionist Communism. While the United States can never be indifferent to the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the permanent stationing of American forces in Europe could hardly be maintained for the object of defending some Communist governments against other Communist governments. Such a deployment could be justified only on the crudest balance of power grounds that would be incompatible with American tradition and American public sentiment.

This is not a personal recommendation as to a desirable policy, but a judgment of stark reality. Significant participation by Communist parties in West European governments will over time undermine the moral and political basis for our present troop deployment in Europe.

The effect on Alliance cohesion generally would be disastrous. The Western Alliance has been held together by a system of close

consultation based on shared goals and compatible philosophies. President de Gaulle cherished France's independence from the United States, but in major crises over Berlin or Soviet missiles in Cuba, he stood firmly with his allies. By the same token, Communist governments in Western Europe, however independent of Moscow they may be on intraparty issues, can be expected to demonstrate their basic Communist convictions on major international issues.

If Communist parties come to power in Western Europe, significant divergences on foreign policy would be bound to develop between Europe and the United States, and between European states in whose governments Communists participate and the others.

In February 1976, Italian Communist leader Berlinguer stated to a *London Times* interviewer that "the Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general interest of mankind." The Italian party newspaper denounced NATO last year as "one of the fundamental instruments for American manipulation of the politics and economy of our country and Western Europe," and urged that "the relations between the countries of Western Europe and the two superpowers must be rediscussed." A leading member of the Italian party's Central Committee was asked in a recent interview with Radio Free Europe: If the French and Italian Communist parties were in power, what would you do in the event of "a grave international crisis between the Soviet Union and the West?" He answered: "We would choose the Soviet side, of course." Such "support" of NATO as is expressed is explicitly tactical, and rests upon a distortion of détente. It is coupled with the proposition that a Soviet threat against Western Europe is inconceivable. No European Communist party suggests that it wishes to be part of a Western Alliance to withstand Soviet expansion. And, indeed, how could Leninist parties dedicate themselves with any conviction to a military alliance whose primary purpose was and remains to counter Soviet power?

To be sure, these parties have had their differences with the Soviet Union, but in practically every case it has been on a matter of relations *within* the Communist movement. They have rarely, if ever, diverged from the Soviet position on an international issue. The Italian Communist party has hailed the Cubans in Angola as "freedom fighters," condemned the Israeli rescue of hostages at Entebbe as an "intolerable violation of Uganda's national sovereignty," applauded Soviet policy in Africa and denounced America's diplomatic efforts

in Southern Africa as an attempt to "save the neocolonial and military-strategic interests of imperialism."

At best, West European Communist parties can be expected to steer their basic policies closer to the so-called nonaligned bloc and in an anti-Western direction. Yugoslavia—whose independence from Moscow on East European issues is by now traditional—has emerged as a champion of anti-Western and anti-American positions on most international issues outside of Eastern Europe. Why should we expect that Communist parties in Western Europe would be more friendly to us than the most independent East European state which has been engaged for nearly three decades in an open dispute with Moscow and whose government the Kremlin has sought repeatedly to undermine?

The strong role our allies play in defending Western interests in many regions of the globe—such as President Giscard's courageous actions in Zaïre—could not be expected from a nation where Communists share power. In the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in relations with the Third World, on Berlin, on arms control and European security, the parallelism of views that has existed between the United States and its European allies would almost certainly be eroded. On the contrary, active opposition especially in regions of traditional European cultural and political influence is probable. In our common efforts to improve the world economy and stimulate progress in both the developed and developing worlds, in the OECD, in the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation and at Heads of Government summits, divisions would soon be apparent. How could Atlantic unity possibly be maintained in such circumstances, even on the security issue?

The military strength and unity of NATO would be gravely weakened. The Communist parties of Western Europe pay lip service to NATO. In fact, it is hard to visualize how the present NATO structure could continue, with its exchange of highly classified information, its integrated military planning and political consultation, if Communists had a significant share of power.

The participation of Communist parties in West European governments would force a major change in NATO practices, as occurred temporarily with Portugal, which had to exclude itself from classified discussions within the organization when its own political future was in doubt. These parties are unlikely to give NATO defense a high

budgetary priority. Communist parties would surely use their power to diminish the combined defense effort of Western Europe and inevitably sap our own will to pay the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe.

Furthermore, if Communists participate in a significant way in the governments of key European countries, NATO may turn by default into a largely German-American alliance. This specter could then be used in other Western European countries to undermine what remains of Atlantic cohesion. With NATO thus weakened, while the Soviet Union continued to increase its strategic and conventional strength and maintained its grip on the Warsaw Pact, the essential equilibrium of power between East and West in Europe would be fundamentally threatened. The freedom of many European countries, allied or neutral, to chart their own future would be diminished in direct proportion as the fear of Soviet power grows. Eventually, massive shifts against us would occur, not because a majority freely chose such a course, but because the upsetting of the overall balance left them no alternative.

The hopeful progress toward European unity would be undermined. The French and Italian Communist parties opposed the creation of the European Common Market as a conspiracy of monopoly capitalism. Until quite recently, they have consistently fought progress toward European unity. Lately they have come to accept the European community as a fact of life; they now say they seek to make it more "democratic" and to transform it, by "a process of innovation . . . in the spheres both of institutions and of general orientations," as Berlinguer expressed it. They can be counted on to re-orient the Common Market towards closer relations with the state economies of Eastern Europe and toward the more extreme of the Third World's demands for a "new international economic order." It can be assumed that they will not encourage European political unity to foster cooperation with the United States; rather they will urge it, if at all, to encourage Third Force tendencies. And over time either governments with Communist participation will pull the others towards them, or deep fissures will open up between the traditional Atlanticists and the "New Left" in the European community. Either outcome would be destructive of European unity and Atlantic solidarity.

Thus whatever hypothesis we consider, Communist participation

in governments of Western Europe will have a profound impact on the international structure as it has developed in the post-war period. We cannot be indifferent or delude ourselves that the advent of Communists to a significant share of power in Western Europe would be less than a watershed in Atlantic relationships.

The American Response

The attitude of the United States towards such developments must of necessity be complex. The crucial role must be that of European governments; the final decision must be that of the European voters. We cannot substitute for either.

In the end, the Communist parties in Western Europe find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in the demoralization, division or disorganization of their opponents; they succeed only when the democratic system seems unable to solve the social problems of the day; when the center does not hold and societies become polarized. Violence—such as that currently tormenting Italy—drives many to support communism in desperation, convinced that drastic remedies are required to end a state of siege which has now spread to the press and other media.

The basic causes of Communist gains thus go deep and are not easy to remedy. In many European countries disillusionment with democratic government and democratic leaders is pervasive. In an era of peace, in a world of bureaucracy and mass production, there is no galvanizing crisis and little opportunity for heroic performance. A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive impersonal bureaucracy disillusion the citizen with the responsiveness of his government, and simultaneously makes the task of elected officials more difficult. In too many democratic countries the young are offered too little inspiration; their elders too often have lost confidence in their own values. Too frequently democratic leaders are consumed by winning and holding office and are unable to demonstrate the force of conviction and philosophical self-assurance of their radical opponents.

The very success of Western societies in maintaining prosperity at a level undreamt of even forty years ago sometimes contributes to

their malaise. Intellectuals condemn society for materialism when it is prosperous and for injustice when it fails to insure prosperity. The widespread economic difficulties of the last four years—recession and inflation unparalleled in a generation, to a large extent induced by the extraordinary increase in oil prices—fuel the frustration of all whose hopes for economic advancement are rebuffed. The interdependence of economies causes inflation and recession to surge across national boundaries, compounding the sense of individual impotence.

And yet, with all these difficulties, the democratic forces of the West have it in their power to determine whether the Communist parties have opportunities to succeed. They have the capacity to put their economies on the path of steady non-inflationary expansion. They have the intellectual capital and the resources to usher in a new period of creativity. Anti-communism is not enough; there must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations, and there must be a reform of the inequities from which these anti-democratic forces derive much of their appeal. With able leadership—and Western cohesion—the democracies can overcome their challenges and usher in a period of dramatic fresh advance.

In this process it is vital that the United States encourage an attitude of resolve and conviction.

First of all, we must frankly recognize the problem that we will face if the Communists come to power in Western Europe and we must understand the practical decisions this will impose on us as a nation. We must avoid facile projections which seek to escape difficult choices by making the most favorable assumptions about what might happen. We must have a program for encouraging the forces of moderation and progress in this critical period and for rallying them should a Communist party nonetheless prevail.

Second, we must avoid giving the impression that we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion by ostentatious association or consultation with Communist leaders or by ambiguous declarations. Communist success is not a foregone conclusion; United States hesitation or ambiguity can, however, contribute to it. Communist parties are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and marked by a fundamental flaw: parties that do not speak for the humane values which have inspired the peoples of the West for centuries are unlikely to appeal to a majority in a Western nation except in a

moment of unsettling crisis. In no Western European country has the Communist party ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their most powerful weapons are fear, distrust and discouragement; their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability. Therefore, we do our friends in Europe no favor if we encourage the notion that the advent of Communists and their allies into power will make little or no difference to our own attitudes and policies. I am talking less of formal statements—which depend on tactical judgments difficult for any outsider to make—than of a clear and unambiguous U.S. attitude.

Some have argued that such a policy would be counterproductive, that it would encourage Communist protest votes. I believe the opposite to be true. On balance, I consider it important that Europe know of America's interest and concern. Many voters in allied countries value the friendship of the United States and appreciate the security supplied by the Atlantic Alliance. We should not ignore them, or demoralize them, or undercut them. The gradual gains scored by the Communist parties over the past years occurred—by definition—at the margin, among voters who had not voted Communist before; who did not vote by anti-American reflex; who for one reason or another were persuaded that the Communists have now become acceptable or indispensable.

There is no evidence that voters are influenced to vote *Communist* by American attitudes. On the contrary, the real danger may well be the other way; many usual opponents of the Communist parties may be lulled by voices, attitudes and ambiguities in this country implying that our traditional opposition has changed. Paradoxically, we even weaken whatever moderate elements may exist in Communist movements by settling too eagerly for verbal reassurances.

If the United States has a responsibility to encourage political freedom throughout the world, we surely have a duty to leave no doubt about our convictions on an issue that is so central to the future of the Western Alliance and therefore to the future of democracy. Human rights is not an abstraction concerned only with judicial procedures and unrelated to basic questions of political and geopolitical structure. We cannot fail to reckon the setback to European freedom that will result if Communist minorities gain decisive influence in European politics; we must not close our eyes to the effect on freedom throughout the world if the global balance tips against the West.

Thirdly, the United States should conduct its policies toward its allies in a way that strengthens the moderate, progressive and democratic governments of Western Europe. We must, on the one hand, avoid demands or lecturing which, whatever the intrinsic merit, magnify domestic fissures in European countries or the sense of impotence of European governments. At the same time, the United States can contribute to a sense of accomplishment by offering vigorous cooperation in joint efforts to solve common problems in the fields of diplomacy, arms control, energy and economic growth. This was the purpose of the economic summits among Western leaders begun by President Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, and continued so successfully in London by President Carter.

The unity and cooperative action of the democracies is crucial to all that America does in the world. Western unity defends not only our security but our way of life and the most basic moral values of our civilization. On this we cannot be neutral. To foster these principles deserves the same dedication and commitment that inspired the most imaginative periods of American diplomacy.

The stagnant societies of the East to which I have referred serve as both a warning and a hope. They remind us that the West's latent intellectual and political vitality, even more than its material prosperity, is the envy of the world. The winds of change are ultimately blowing from the West. The men and women of *Eastern* Europe are certainly aware that the West, for all its doubt and sense of spiritual dilemma, is the vanguard of modernization, the vital source of learning and of much of modern culture, and the haven of the free human spirit. The developing countries yearning for progress also turn to the West, not the East, for assistance, support, and the measure of what man can achieve when he aspires. Our technology, our creativity, our unequaled economic vigor, not some bureaucratic doctrine of economic determinism, are the forces that will shape the future if we mobilize the energies of free peoples.

This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence. It is a time for confidence, determination and hope. The power of free men and women and free nations acting in concern, confident of their strength and of their destiny, cannot be matched by any totalitarian régime or totalitarian movement. The spirit of freedom can never be crushed. But freedom can be lost gradually. Such a danger exists today in Western Europe, and that threat could have consequences not only

in Europe but throughout the community of democracies and the world.

If we cherish freedom, we will face the peril, marshal joint efforts to overcome it and begin a period of new fulfillment for our peoples. Western Europe, our closest partner and the cradle of much of our civilization, is too precious to us for us to do otherwise.

No. 101 **The Nobel Prize in Economics, 1976.** Milton Friedman

No. 102 **The Growth of American Government.** Roger A. Freeman

No. 103 **Communist Parties in Western Europe: Challenge to the West.**
Henry A. Kissinger